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WATER MARKETING AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 
 
Richard W. Wahl* 
  
Seeking greater efficiency of water use 
has become one of the hallmarks of current 
discussions of water supply management. In 
most urban areas, public utilities either initiate 
or are drawn into discussions of water 
conservation, system optimization, and 
efficient pricing. In terms of water supplied by 
the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency 
charged with building major federal water 
supply facilities in the 17 western states, the 
potential for such measures has only begun to 
be explored, although it was emphasized at 
least as far back as the report of the National 
Water Commission in 1973 (U.S. National 
Water Commission, 1973). The subject is 
likely to receive increasing attention simply 
because of the vast federal resources already 
in place. The Bureau of Reclamation controls 
major storage and conveyance facilities in the 
western states, which in 1986 supplied more 
than 30 million acre-feet of water--27 million 
acre-feet for irrigation, 3 million acre-feet for 
municipal and industrial uses, and another 
million acre-feet for additional uses, as well as 
providing hydropower production, recreational 
opportunities, and flood control. To the extent 
that conservation can be achieved 
inexpensively, existing Bureau of Reclamation 
supplies represent a tremendous resource—
both in terms of salvaging unused return flows 
and in reallocating water to uses with higher 
economic returns. For example, the Imperial 
Irrigation District (IID) in southern California 
diverts up to 3 million acre-feet annually from 
the Colorado River, more than 20% of the 
total net diversions from the river. Conserving 
15% of this water would yield 450,000 acre-
feet--an amount equal to the projected growth 
in demand 
to the year 2000 of the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California (MWD), which 
serves 27 member agencies on the Southern 
California coastal plain. 
 
In fact, two recent agreements between 
the MWD and the Imperial Irrigation District 
present a dramatic example of these 
conservation possibilities. In late 1988 MWD 
struck an agreement with IID to fund 
conservation measures that would salvage 
100,000 acre-feet of water annually for 
municipal and industrial uses in the MWD 
service area. Under the agreement, MWD will 
pay IID $92 million for the construction of 
conservation facilities, $3.1 million annually 
for operation and maintenance, and $23 
million in five annual installments for indirect 
costs. Under a separate arrangement, concrete 
lining of the All-American Canal (which 
carries water from the Colorado River to IID) 
will conserve another 70,000 acre-feet of 
water for use by MWD. Studies by the Bureau 
of Reclamation and the State of California 
estimate that there are up to another 250,000 
acre-feet of water conservation investments in 
the Imperial district that could serve as the 
basis for future agreements (see Wahi and 
Davis, 1986). Agreements of this type, 
involving water already under contract, have 
come to be called “voluntary water transfers” 
or “water marketing.” Voluntary water 
transfers can be either short-term leases, 
annual rentals, long-term leases, dry-year 
option agreements, or permanent sales. 
 
There are several reasons to believe that 
water transfer agreements, along with 
improved 
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system optimization, are likely to become the 
principal vehicles for improvements in the 
efficiency of use of federally supplied water, 
rather than pricing or mandatory conservation 
measures. . The roots are historical. When the 
Bureau of Reclamation was established in 1902, 
its primary goal was a social one--the settlement 
of the arid west with small family farms, 
originally limited to 160-acre ownerships. 
Repayment to recover costs was secondary, as 
reflected by the fact that repayment for irrigation 
investment was interest-free over 10 years. When 
many of the original projects ran into additional 
difficulty (such as poor soils or inadequate 
drainage) or encountered problems with 
repayment, the federal response was to increase 
expenditure to solve the problems, combined 
with easing the repayment terms. Eventually this 
lead to legislation authorizing interest-free 
payment over 50 years for irrigation, further 
reduced in some cases to the growers “ability to 
pay.” This means that, on average, irrigation 
districts repay only about 15% of the cost of the 
irrigation investments on a present-worth basis. 
Furthermore, these financial terms are written 
into long-term Bureau contracts with water users 
and are not subject to much change or 
adjustment. 
 
Therefore, the Bureau’s water pricing 
differs substantially from that of a publicutility. 
Utilities base their water prices on the cost of 
investment, plus a rate of return and, after 
approval by a regulatory commission, rates 
change periodically. One other difference is that 
the Bureau is a water wholesaler that contracts 
with water districts, rather than final consumers 
(household or farms). Of course, districts could 
price water more efficiently to their consumers, 
but in the absence of state regulation of those 
districts, the forces against this are considerable 
because the charges for water to Bureau districts 
is low. Therefore, the avenue of pricing reform 
for federal water at the level of federal 
contracting is virtually closed in most instances. 
On the other hand, the fact that the Bureau has 
long-term contracts for large blocks of water with 
a relatively small number of districts, rather than 
adjustable rates to thousands of final consumers, 
means that re-marketing of supplies between 
these districts is a much more viable possibility 
than resales between customers of the average 
public utility. Transfer between Reclamation 
districts or to other districts would be analogous 
to transactions among public utilities. (Similar 
transfers have been discussed among the water 
districts served by California’s State Water 
Project.) 
 
Mandatory conservation measures have 
been incorporated into building codes in urban 
areas. However, similar measures have not taken 
hold on irrigated lands served by the Bureau of 
Reclamation, even though districts are required 
by 1982 legislation to submit conservation plans 
to the Bureau. This is probably due to several 
factors, including the low price of water, the lack 
of specific standards and enforcement measures 
on the part of the Bureau, and the inability of 
farmers to finance more expensive conservation 
measures. The IID to MWD transfers illustrate 
that financing of conservation measures by 
parties outside an irrigation district can overcome 
all of these obstacles. 
 
There have, in fact, been a number of 
transfers involving Reclamation water users in 
the past (for additional detail, see Wahi and 
Osterhoudt, 1986). Water rentals in the system of 
federal storage reservoirs on the Upper Snake 
River in Idaho stretch back to the 1930s and were 
explicitly recognized in the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s contracts with water users. In 
1980, the Idaho legislature gave further backing 
to such arrangements by authorizing the state to 
operate water banks. In 1972, the Utah Power and 
Light Company obtained 6,000 acre-feet of water 
from two irrigation companies in the federal 
Emery County project for power plant cooling. 
The City of Casper, Wyoming, is paying the 
nearby Casper-Alcova Irrigation District for 
canal lining on portions of the district’s fifty-
nine-mile canal and 190-mile lateral system in 
order to reduce seepage. The exchange is 
intended to provide the city with 7,000 acre-feet 
of water. During the 1976-77 drought in 
California, the 
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Bureau of Reclamation operated a water bank in 
which some 45,000 acre-feet of water changed 
hands for total payments of $2.2 million. In the 
Ft. Collins area, there is a highly organized 
market operating in the Northern Colorado 
Water Conservancy District, in which water 
from the Colorado Big Thompson Project is 
exchanged at market value. Share prices for 
permanent rights to Colorado-Big Thompson 
water (expressed in 1980 dollars) rose from $99 
per acre-foot in 1961 to over $2800 per acre-foot 
in 1980, although prices have declined 
considerably since that time. 
 
There is reason to believe that the number 
of transfer requests will increase in the future. 
 
(1) Water rights on Bureau of Reclamation 
projects are obtained under state law, and over 
the past decade many western states have 
modified their water codes to facilitate transfers 
of water (Idaho in 1981, California in 1982, 
Oregon in 1987), and similar legislation has 
been introduced in other states, such as 
Washington in 1987 and 1988. 
 
(2) Accompanying these changes in state law 
and because of increasing competition for water, 
there has been a growing number of water 
transfers in the western states (for a discussion 
of dozens of transfers in the southwestern states, 
see Saliba and Bush, 1987, or the Water Market 
Update newsletter published by Shupe and 
Associates, in Santa Fe, New Mexico). 
 
(3) In 1986 and 1987, the Western Governors’ 
Association (WGA) focused attention on water 
efficiency and issued reports suggesting further 
changes in both state and federal law and policy 
to facilitate transfers (Western Governors’ 
Association, 1986 and 1987). 
 
(4) Concern over reducing the federal budget 
deficit has limited federal financing for 
constructing new projects. Requirements for 
higher levels of nonfederal cost-sharing for new 
projects began focusing more attention on better 
allocation and use of existing supplies. 
(5) In September, 1987, the Bureau of 
Reclamation issued a report entitled Assessment 
'87 which indicated that 
 
The Bureau’s primary role as the developer of large 
federally financed agricultural projects is drawing to 
a close.... The Bureau of Reclamation must change 
from an agency based on federally supported 
construction to one based on resource management. 
 
The report goes on to discuss some ways in 
which the Bureau could facilitate more efficient 
resource management, including developing a 
water marketing policy to allow contractors to 
sublease water at a profit. The report also 
highlights improved systems analysis of multi-
reservoir systems to enhance their dependable 
yield, nonfederal operation of Bureau facilities, 
transfer of title of facilities to water districts, and 
increased roles in the areas of groundwater 
management and water quality. 
 
(6) In December, 1988, the Department of the 
Interior responded to the July, 1987 WGA report 
by issuing a set of principles designed to guide 
Bureau of Reclamation review and approval of 
water transfer requests. Under these principles 
the Bureau is directed to facilitate transfer 
proposals brought to it by interested water users, 
provided the transfer complies with state law 
and injures no third parties. Most important, the 
Department policy will allow districts to profit 
from transfers, once federal costs are paid. This 
latter provision results from a recommendation 
contained in the WGA’s report that it was 
necessary to have an economic incentive to 
facilitate transfers of federally supplied water. 
For those transfers from agricultural to 
municipal and industrial use, the Bureau of 
Reclamation would also receive increased 
revenues since municipal and industrial use 
carries interest charges under Reclamation law, 
but irrigation use does not. The Department’s 
water transfer principles are designed to 
standardize Bureau of Reclamation policy from 
one project and region to another. For example, 
in the Central Valley Project in California, 
increased income to a district reassigning its 
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contractual deliveries had previously been 
prohibited as a matter of policy, although it is 
not a provision of Reclamation contracts or 
Reclamation law. In the Central Arizona 
Project, profit on transfers between districts 
had been virtually ruled out by the contracts 
themselves (for additional background on this 
policy, as well as other contractual and 
legislative reforms that could further facilitate 
transfer of federally supplied water, see Wahi, 
1987 and 1989, and Western Governors’ 
Association, 1987). 
 
The new orientation by the Bureau 
toward more efficient management of existing 
resources should set off a new round of 
applied research, as well as increased water 
trading activity, because it raises a number of 
practical questions as how best to utilize water 
from existing facilities. Trading water holds 
considerable potential to enhance efficiency 
for those water uses traditionally subject to 
contract--municipal and industrial uses, 
irrigation, and hydropower. However, 
increased trading activity will also place 
continued responsibilities with state and 
federal governments for protecting instream 
uses of water for recreation and fish and 
wildlife purposes, purposes for which water is 
not traditionally marketed. Although in some 
states, purchases of or donations of water 
for instream uses may come to be one vehicle 
for supplementing instream flows, government 
regulation and protection of instream flows is. 
likely to call for evaluations of water for these 
purposes as well. 
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